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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for asset forfeiture
34 results foundAuthor: Richardson, Amy Title: Understanding Forfeitures: An Analysis of the Relationship Between Case Details and Forfeiture Among TEOAF High-Forfeiture and Major Cases Summary: The Treasury Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF) administers the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF), which is the receipt account for the deposits of nontax forfeitures that result from law-enforcement actions against criminal enterprises, such as drug cartels, terrorist organizations, and individual embezzlers, by agencies that are currently, or were historically, part of the U.S. Treasury — the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation division, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Secret Service. High levels of forfeiture from the prosecution of these crimes serve to punish the individuals involved, help to dismantle the operations associated with the crime, may deter others from engaging in similar crimes, and provide funds to support future investigations among participating agencies. TEOAF commissioned the RAND Corporation to examine the relationship between targeted funding support of significant financial investigations and the forfeiture outcomes of such investigations. This report presents the findings of that analysis. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2011 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR631.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR631.pdf Shelf Number: 120842 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureFinancial Crimes |
Author: Greenberg, Theodore S. Title: Stolen Asset Recovery: A Good Practices Guide for Non-Conviction Based Asset Forfeiture Summary: Non-Conviction Based (NCB) asset forfeiture is a powerful tool for recovering the proceeds of corruption, particularly in cases where the proceeds have been transferred abroad. Because it provides for the restraint, seizure, and forfeiture of tainted assets without the need for a criminal conviction, it can be the best option when the wrongdoer is dead, has fled the jurisdiction, is immune from prosecution, or is too powerful to prosecute — all common in cases of grand corruption. A growing number of jurisdictions have established a system to allow NCB forfeiture, and it has been recommended as a tool for asset recovery at regional and multilateral levels. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) urges countries to consider taking such measures as may be necessary to allow NCB asset forfeiture in cases in which “the offender cannot be prosecuted by reason of death, flight or absence or in other appropriate cases.” With this increased focus on the issue, there is a corresponding need for a practical tool that jurisdictions contemplating NCB forfeiture legislation can use. Stolen Asset Recovery: A Good Practices Guide for Non-Conviction Based Asset Forfeiture is that practical tool. It is the first book of its kind on the subject and the first knowledge publication under the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative. A collaborative effort of practitioners of forfeiture and NCB forfeiture, Stolen Asset Recovery identifies the key concepts—legal, operational, and practical —that an NCB asset forfeiture system should encompass to be eff ective in recovering stolen assets. Thirty-six key concepts are explored through practical experiences, examples from cases, and excerpts from NCB asset forfeiture legislation. Details: Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009. 284p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2011 at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/web_ressources/IBRDWB_Guidassetrecovery.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/web_ressources/IBRDWB_Guidassetrecovery.pdf Shelf Number: 121252 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureCorruptionMoney Laundering |
Author: Cavanagh, Ben Title: A Review Of Reinvestment In Financial Investigation From The Proceeds Of Crime Summary: In January 2010, the Scottish Government provided matched funding of £1 million (£500k from Scottish Government and £500k from the police) to 3 forces to improve their capacity for financial investigation, the range of uses to which it is applied and its overall impact. The funding was intended to increase the number of financial investigators working in police forces with the objective of targeting community level criminal activity. Decisions about the nature of the posts, where they would be based and how they would be tasked and managed, were left for forces to make in light of local needs and priorities. There were however important reference points for senior managers in Force Investigation Units (FIUs) to help inform these decisions. These included a joint Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland (HMICS) and Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland (IPS) report about proceeds of crime and financial investigation, with recommendations for the improvement of financial investigation and Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) systems. They also included a number of training and guidance manuals developed by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA). The stated aims for the reinvestment project were to ‘improve financial investigation’ and ‘increase the number of financial investigators in local force divisions with the objective of targeting community level criminal activity.’ The assessment of the impact of the extra funding is therefore conceived in a number of ways related to these aims including: consideration of how far the new funding supported the achievement of the HMICS/IPS recommendations for POCA and financial investigation, the extent to which police forces realised their own hopes for the local development of financial investigation, and, how far the funding has helped it make its maximum and most efficient contribution to policing outcomes beyond those most directly related to the use of ‘proceeds of crime’ legislation. The research included interviews with senior managers, financial investigators, and officials from other parts of the financial recovery systems, including the Crown Office’s National Casework Division (renamed in March 2011 as the Serious Organised Crime Division) and Civil Recovery Unit, who use the products of financial investigators in their asset recovery work, as well as the collation of available administrative and management data, and analysis of apparent trends. Details: Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research, 2011. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 25, 2011 at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/10/20092612/10 Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/10/20092612/10 Shelf Number: 123144 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureCriminal Investigation (U.K.)Financial InvestigationsMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeProceeds of Crime |
Author: Doyle, Charles Title: Crime and Forfeiture Summary: Forfeiture has long been an effective law enforcement tool. Congress and state legislatures have authorized its use for over two hundred years. Every year, it redirects property worth billions of dollars from criminal to lawful uses. Forfeiture law has always been somewhat unique. Legislative bodies, commentators and the courts, however, had begun to examine its eccentricities in greater detail because under some circumstances it could be not only harsh but unfair. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), P.L. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000), was a product of that reexamination. Modern forfeiture follows one of two procedural routes. Although crime triggers all forfeitures, they are classified as civil forfeitures or criminal forfeitures according to the nature of the procedure which ends in confiscation. Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding. The property is the defendant in the case. Unless the statute provides otherwise, the innocence of the owner is irrelevant—it is enough that the property was involved in a violation to which forfeiture attaches. As a matter of expedience and judicial economy, Congress often allows administrative forfeiture in uncontested civil confiscation cases. Criminal forfeiture is an in personam proceeding, and confiscation is only possible upon the conviction of the owner of the property. The Supreme Court has held that authorities may seize moveable property without prior notice or an opportunity for a hearing but that real property owners are entitled as a matter of due process to preseizure notice and a hearing. As a matter of due process, innocence may be irrelevant in the case of an individual who entrusts his or her property to someone who uses the property for criminal purposes. Although some civil forfeitures may be considered punitive for purposes of the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause, civil forfeitures do not implicate the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause unless they are so utterly punitive as to belie remedial classification. The statutes governing the disposal of forfeited property may authorize its destruction, its transfer for governmental purposes, or deposit of the property or of the proceeds from its sale in a special fund. Intergovernmental transfers and the use of special funds are hallmarks of federal forfeiture. Every year federal agencies transfer hundreds of millions of dollars and property to state, local, and foreign law enforcement officials as compensation for their contribution to joint enforcement efforts. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: 97-139: Accessed June 18, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-139.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-139.pdf Shelf Number: 129032 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureCriminal Forfeiture (U.S.) |
Author: McFadden, Michael Title: Targeting the Profits of Illicit Drug Trafficking through Proceeds of Crime Actions Summary: Current methods of reporting the impact of proceeds of crime action typically underreport their effect on drug trafficking activity. This is because they rely principally on the raw value of confiscated assets without considering the downstream impact of assets denied on the future operations of the drug trafficking organisation. To address this deficit, the authors developed the Proceeds of Crime Drug Disruption Index (POCDDI), which attempts to better capture the short and medium-term impact of proceeds of crime action, taking into account current knowledge regarding the profitability and reinvestment behaviour of drug traffickers at different stages of the production and distribution process. Results support the argument that the raw value of confiscated assets substantially underestimate the real impact of proceeds of crime action, with medium-term estimates suggesting an impact of 11.9 times raw value for distributors, importers and producers of illicit drugs. Analyses of data provided by the Australian Federal Police also addressed the question of what factors are associated with successful or unsuccessful proceeds of crime actions, taking into account asset type, value, offence type and time elapsed at different stages of the case. Details: Canberra: National Drug Law Enforcement Research Fund, 2014. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Monograph Series No. 52: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: http://www.ndlerf.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/monographs/monograph52.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ndlerf.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication-documents/monographs/monograph52.pdf Shelf Number: 132193 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureDrug Trafficking Illicit Drugs Proceeds of Crime |
Author: Forte, Roberto, ed. Title: Organised Crime and the Fight Against Crime in the Western Balkans: a Comparison with the Italian Models and Practices. General overview and perspectives for the future Summary: The project SAPUCCA (Sharing Alternative Practices for the Utilisation of Confiscated Criminal Assets), co-funded by the European Commission's Programme "ISEC 2009 - DG Home Affairs", is aimed at encouraging, promoting and elaborating methods and tools to prevent and fight organised crime, and at experimenting good practices for the re-use of assets confiscated to criminal organisations for social and institutional purposes. As the foremost output of the project, the Policy paper "Organised Crime and the Fight Against Crime in the Western Balkans: a Comparison with the Italian Models and Practices. General overview and perspectives for the future" has been published. The authors are Natale Argiro, Mauro Baldascino, Mario Battello, Atanas Rusev, Luigi Gay, Dafne Papandrea and Domenico Zinzi, and the paper is edited by Roberto Forte. The document offers an overview of the situation of organised crime in the Western Balkans in general and in individual Countries -- Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro -- as well as a focus on the recent legislation on the recovery and management of criminal assets in Bulgaria, used as a term of confrontation with the consolidated approach applied in Italy to such issues. It offers as well a study on the extensibility of the Italian model in Europe, and a feasibility analysis on the extension of the model to the Western Balkans. Details: Rome?: SAPUCCA: Sharing Alternative Practices for the Utilization of Confiscated Criminal Assets, 2013. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper: Accessed September 9, 2014 at: http://flarenetwork.org/documents/Sapucca-pubbl-final.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://flarenetwork.org/documents/Sapucca-pubbl-final.pdf Shelf Number: 133189 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime (Europe) |
Author: Transparency International UK Title: Closing Down the Safe Havens: Ending Impunity for Corrupt Individuals by Seizing and Recovering their Assets in the UK Summary: Corrupt funds that are laundered through the UK represent misery for millions of people. The money has been stolen from health and education budgets, from infrastructure and law enforcement, and many other areas of public spending. This both degrades those services and removes funds that should rightfully be invested in their country of origin. The stolen funds should be identified, frozen, seized and - with proper safeguards - returned to the rightful owners. This is what the recovery of corruptly-obtained assets aims to achieve. The purpose of this paper is to describe the blocks in the system that are preventing recovery of the proceeds of grand corruption located in, or routed through, the UK. Details: London: Transparency International UK, 2013. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 7, 2015 at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/809-closing-down-the-safe-havens Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/809-closing-down-the-safe-havens Shelf Number: 135168 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureFraud and Corruption (U.K.)Money Laundering |
Author: Savona, Ernesto U. Title: From Illegal markets to Legitimate Businesses: the Portfolio of Organised Crime in Europe Summary: This is the final report of Project OCP - Organised Crime Portfolio (www.ocportfolio.eu). Aim of OCP is to carry out an exploratory study of the economics of organised crime in Europe, and in particular to address three research questions, which are covered by the three sections of this report: - Where organised crime proceeds are generated, from which illicit markets (Part 1); - Where these proceeds are then invested in the legitimate economy, in which regions, assets and business sectors (Part 2); - The extent to which these proceeds are confiscated by European authorities (Part 3). The project focuses on seven EU member states (Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom), represented by OCP partners, and for which provides an in-depth analysis. However, the report also presents a broader examination of the situation in Europe as a whole. OCP deals with issues crucial from a policy standpoint but which are characterised by a lack of data and of previous studies. OCP addresses this research gap by adopting an innovative methodology and using a wide range of information, both qualitative and quantitative, deriving from very different sources. Despite its pioneering nature and its data limitations, this report represents a first step towards better understanding of how the organised crime business works. In line with the Transcrime research agenda, it is a starting point for a better identification and reduction of the opportunities exploited by criminals to infiltrate illicit and legitimate markets in Europe. In this sense, this report constitutes an important tool for both public and private institutions to improve the assessment of the risks of organised crime infiltration and to strengthen the tracing and the confiscation of criminal assets in Europe. Details: Milan, Italy: Transcrime, 2015. 341p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.transcrime.it/en/pubblicazioni/the-portfolio-of-organised-crime-in-europe/ Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: https://www.int-comp.org/media/1997/ocp-full-report.pdf Shelf Number: 136004 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureEconomics of CrimeIllicit MarketsOrganized CrimeProceeds of Crime |
Author: U.S. Department of the Treasury. Office of Foreign Asets Control Title: Impact Report on Economic Sanctions Against Colombia Drug Cartels Summary: Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") integrates regulatory, national security, investigative, enforcement, and intelligence elements towards a single goal: effective implementation of economic sanctions programs against foreign threats and adversaries. OFAC currently administers and enforces more than 30 economic sanctions programs pursuant to Presidential and Congressional mandates, targeting select foreign countries and regimes, terrorist organizations, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, and narcotics traffickers. OFAC acts under general Presidential wartime and national emergency powers, as well as specific legislation, to prohibit transactions and freeze (or "block") assets within the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons, including their foreign branches. These programs are administered in conjunction with diplomatic, law enforcement and occasionally military action. Since 1995, the Executive Branch has developed an array of "targeted" sanctions programs that focus on drug cartels and traffickers, international terrorist groups, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, members of hostile regimes, and other individuals and groups whose activities threaten U.S. interests. Narcotics traffickers operating on a global scale require an extensive support network, including procurement, logistics, transportation, communications, security, money laundering, and other facilitation. Disguising the sometimes vast profits derived from major drug operations requires the purchase of ostensibly legitimate enterprises capable of handling business on an international scale. These illicitly funded "corporate empires" can be extensive, complex, and undermine the integrity of financial systems. They are also one of the drug cartels' greatest vulnerabilities. To combat the threats of violence, corruption, and harm posed by narcotics traffickers and their networks, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12978 in October 1995, declaring a national emergency with respect to significant foreign narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia. The impact of these sanctions has been significant and, at times, dramatic. When OFAC designates an individual or entity, any assets within the United States or the possession or control of a U.S. person anywhere in the world, must be frozen. Trade with or through the United States is cut off. Moreover, many non-U.S. businesses and banks have voluntarily severed all ties with individuals and entities that OFAC has listed. As a result, designated persons may lose access to their bank accounts outside the United States, disrupting their operations and freedom of access. Finally, in many cases, Colombian authorities have taken law enforcement actions against designated companies or properties after OFAC listed them. Collectively, these actions have disrupted more than $1 billion worth of assets - in blockings, seizures, forfeitures, and the failure of enterprises - and economically isolated the individuals who own and manage the enterprises. The Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP"), in fact, stated that OFAC's efforts have resulted in "the forfeiture of billions of dollars worth of drug-related assets." This report reviews the SDNT program's achievements over the past 11 years, as it has targeted the leaders of Colombia's Cali, North Valle, and North Coast drug cartels. It is our hope that the report will provide a useful window into the history and achievements of this program, as well as lessons for refining sanctions targeting and implementation in the future in this and other programs. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2007. 180p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/narco_impact_report_05042007.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Colombia URL: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/narco_impact_report_05042007.pdf Shelf Number: 136005 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureDrug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceEconomic Sanctions |
Author: Matrix Insight Title: Assessing the effectiveness of EU Member States' practices in the identification, tracing, freezing and confiscation of criminal assets Summary: The EU Action Plan to combat organised crime of April 19971 States that: "The European Council stresses the importance for each Member State of having well developed and wide ranging legislation in the field of confiscation of the proceeds of crime..." Furthermore, the EU Millennium Strategy States that "The European Council is determined to ensure that concrete steps are taken to trace, freeze, seize and confiscate the proceeds of crime". In line with these undertakings, and having regard to the urgency of controlling criminal assets in the face of terrorist threat, the Action Plan for the Hague Programme is currently reviewing EU legislation in this area and, if necessary, will strengthen it. The target date for completing this process is 20083. Obtaining an accurate, reliable and comprehensive overview of the practice of, and provisions for, criminal asset identification, tracing, freezing and confiscation across EU Member States is a critical phase in this process. The European Commission DG JLS therefore commissioned Matrix Knowledge Group (referred to in the text as "Matrix") to provide an overview of the enforcement of confiscation provisions in all EU Member States. For this purpose, Matrix has undertaken a literature review, interviews, case studies and a statistical and qualitative quota sample survey in order to: - map current practice around the investigative, judicial and disposal phases of the asset recovery process, noting use of specific tools and techniques in investigation (with relative frequency of use) and levels of cooperation with banks, financial and nonfinancial institutions; - identify effective practice by country (with a view to knowledge transfer); - identify obstacles to effective implementation of existing legal provisions by country; distinguishing where possible between jurisprudential and other causes of impediment and, where jurisprudential causes are identified, whether modification of the relevant EU instrument would be appropriate; - examine the potential for cooperation and information exchange between EU Member State asset recovery agencies and between those agencies and similar agencies in third party jurisdictions; - set up and, as far as practicable, populate a statistical model of Member States' asset recovery activities; - propose a performance index for asset recovery operations of Member States (such an index may contain input, output and outcome elements); - produce a set of overarching summary conclusions about the effectiveness of asset recovery procedures at an operational level, diagnosis of shortcomings classified by type of cause and recommendations about potential points of treatment intervention and the nature of plausible treatments; - estimate the likely benefits accruing from implementing recommended treatments and identifying the main points of institutional and agency impact; - provide an impact map identifying which Member States are likely to experience the greatest degree of positive change if recommendations are implemented. Details: Brussels: European Commission, Directorate-General Justice, Freedom & Security, 2009. 189p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/20120312/final_asset_recovery_report_june_2009.pdf Year: 2009 Country: Europe URL: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/20120312/final_asset_recovery_report_june_2009.pdf Shelf Number: 136006 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureEconomic SanctionsOrganized CrimeProceeds of Crime |
Author: Fraschini, Giorgio Title: Illicit Assets Recovery in Italy. Summary: Transparency International Italy (TI -It), in collaboration with the Chamber of Commerce of Naples, presents today, February 27th, the report "ILLICIT ASSETS RECOVERY IN ITALY - Enhancing Integrity and Effectiveness of Illegal Asset Confiscation" at the Chamber of Commerce in Naples. The report is the result of a research carried out within the European project "Enhancing Integrity and Effectiveness of Illegal Asset Confiscation - European Approaches" ( www.confiscation.eu), commissioned and funded by the European Commission. Transparency International Italy participates in the project along with two other national chapters of Transparency International: Transparency International Romania and Bulgaria. The cooperation among European partners is even more important now in light of the resolution adopted by the European Parliament two days ago in order to facilitate the confiscation proceedings and the cooperation among national authorities of EU Member States. The Italian report digs into our illicit assets confiscation system, through a detailed analysis of the legislation, interviews and statistics. It investigates the weaknesses of the system and also promotes practical recommendations. Considering the urgency of fighting corruption in Italy, confiscation of assets coming from illegal activities, such as corruption, becomes crucial, because it has both a punitive and preventive value. "Italian legislation reflects this duality, which is almost a unique worldwide: Italy has in fact both a criminal and preventive system of confiscation" - researchers Chiara Putaturo and Giorgio Fraschini say - "The strong precautionary power of confiscation lies mainly in the re-use of assets for social purposes. If properly implemented , it has a high educational and exemplary value for the entire community". Maria Teresa Brassiolo, Past President of Transparency International Italy, highlights one of the main risks: "Unfortunately, most confiscated companies are not efficiently managed. This must to be solved immediately. The weakness or the closure of legal businesses can create a strong negative image of a context where criminal organisations can run their activities and create jobs, hiding the dark side of illegality, such as tax evasion, labour and insurance violations. Criminals, at the same time benefit, without paying, from infrastructure , schools, hospitals, which are finanaced by citizens and legal firms". TI-It offers a list of recommendations: - A consolidated act of law on confiscation - Speeding up judicial and assignment procedures - Strengthening of the National Agency for the administration and the assignment of the goods seized and confiscated from criminal organizations - Computerising the system - Immediate availability of funds recovered through the sale of movable assets to support the effective management of immovable assets and companies - allocation and efficient use of resources of the Justice Unique Fund for the management of seized companies, too - Involvement of expert with managerial skills - Implementation of the support units at the Prefectures - Establishment of a monitoring system Details: Naples: Transparency International Italia, 2013. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Enhancing Integrity and Effectiveness of Illegal Asset Confiscation - European Approaches" project report: http://www.transparency.bg/media/cms_page_media/141/NationalReport_TI-IT_en_Illicit_Assets_Recovery_in_Italy.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Italy URL: http://www.transparency.bg/media/cms_page_media/141/NationalReport_TI-IT_en_Illicit_Assets_Recovery_in_Italy.pdf Shelf Number: 136290 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureCorruptionFinancial CrimesOrganized Crime |
Author: Council of Europe. Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) Title: Typologies Report on Laundering the Proceeds of Organised Crime Summary: 1. The project to examine the laundering methods used by organised crime (OC) was approved by the 41st MONEYVAL Plenary in April 2013. It was agreed that the project team should examine the methods used by organised criminal groups to launder illegally earned profits and should try to assess potential regional vulnerabilities. It was also agreed that trends, methods, red flags and indicators, the means of identification and analysis of organised crime money flows should all be addressed in the report in order to enhance the capabilities of competent authorities in such cases. 2. Two expert meetings were held in the context of this research: the inaugural meeting of delegations was organised in October 2013 in Strasbourg; this was followed by a second meeting, bringing together prosecutors and judges in May 2014 in San Marino. 3. The reason for conducting this research is the recognition that OC presents one of the major threats to the Rule of Law in Europe and globally. A large percentage of all the criminal proceeds that are laundered world-wide are laundered by or on behalf of OC. 4. The report highlights a number of significant challenges to the effective investigation and prosecution of laundering the funds derived from organised crime and achieving final confiscation of assets. Some of these problems arise due to a lack of resources or relevant expertise, some due to reluctance of prosecutors in some jurisdictions to tackle difficult cases and some are caused by the very nature of the laundering techniques themselves. The main problems identified were: - Lack of financial, accounting and IT expertise; - Intelligence gaps; - Lack of adequate risk analysis; - Inadequate domestic coordination; - Failure to use the full range of powers and practices available; - The perception of some prosecutors that they have always to identify a specific predicate offence from which the proceeds are derived for a successful 3rd party prosecution; - Reluctance of prosecutors to tackle difficult cases; - Delay in applying provisional measures rendering any subsequent confiscation orders less effective; - Transnational transactions and difficulties caused by mutual legal assistance; - Exploitation of new technologies by organised crime groups; - Lack of transparency of corporate vehicles. 5. The report sets out a number of recommendations on measures that jurisdictions can adopt in order to improve the investigation and prosecution of OC-related ML and the final confiscation of their criminal proceeds. In particular, the report highlights the need to make full use of the powers available to investigators and prosecutors. The recommended measures include: - Ensuring that there is more high-level commitment to prosecuting OC ML and pursuing deterrent confiscation orders in those cases; - Including any special issues raised by OC in the ML national risk assessment; - Ratifying the Warsaw Convention and implementing the revised Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations 2012 (in particular Recommendation 30 (Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative agencies)); - Focusing on confiscation; - Focusing on third party money laundering; - Making full use of FIU powers and expertise; - Using financial profiling, trained specialists and expert witnesses; - Developing national cooperation, coordination and feed-back and improving domestic information exchange; - Expediting international information exchange; - Increasing the transparency of information on the real owners of companies and trusts; - Improving financial supervision; - Utilising media campaigns, particularly in relation to the risks of persons being exploited unintentionally by OC as money mules. 6. The report draws conclusions on trends from the responses received. It is noted that OCGs will in practice use all available means to launder the proceeds of crime and have the ability to adapt quickly to changing law enforcement and AML/CFT environments. Nonetheless, a number of particular trends were identified, including exploitation of poorly regulated financial institutions and DNFBPs, as well as an increasing use of international transactions by OCGs. The main trends are, however, mostly typical of money laundering generally, but specifically in the OC context include: - Exploitation of poorly regulated sectors; - Development of transnational infrastructures to launder funds; - Use of legal persons to hide criminally derived funds; - Use of professionals; - Use of new technologies. 7. The report assesses some of the techniques that have proved successful in investigating and prosecuting the laundering of the proceeds from OC and achieving final confiscations. The analysis considers risk identification as a strategic starting point, ways of detecting potential OC-related transactions (both at the level of FIUs and LEAs), the analytical processes involved, financial investigations and financial profiling and also covers challenges to and best practices for the achievement of convictions and confiscations. 8. It appears that OC and ML are rarely analysed at a strategic level by decision-makers together in jurisdictions. The report suggests that a better collective understanding of the OC vulnerabilities and threats is critical for those who are responsible for overall resource allocation for investigation and prosecution of OC cases. 9. The ability of the reporting entities themselves to detect OCG-related funds for reporting purposes seems limited. Financial institutions rely typically on the information available on the internet or from public and commercial databases. 10. At the FIU level, in order to identify potential OCG indicators, the analysts mostly rely on the number of persons involved in suspicious transaction reports (STR). There are no distinctive procedures for OCG-related STRs but, when recognised, such cases are prioritised and analysed in more detail. 11. Financial investigations are always a key element in ML cases, whether the proceeds result from OC activities or not. This survey revealed that, when deciding upon the initiation of parallel financial investigations, there are no differences between an organised crime case and any other case. 12. In some jurisdictions, the criteria for initiation of a parallel financial investigation is provided by legislation and can be activated automatically in proceeds-generating cases. In other jurisdictions the decision is taken by investigators and prosecutors on a case-by-case basis. There are no special investigative powers dedicated to financial investigations carried out in OC cases. The report concludes that wider use of the power to monitor bank accounts and/or to postpone transactions should increase effectiveness in the asset tracing and freezing processes. 13. One useful tool in asset recovery which has been identified is the use of financial profiles. These are descriptions of the investigated persons' licit income compared with their expenditure and lifestyle. Building such profiles can better assist the authorities to identify unexplained wealth. Nonetheless, such profiles are not routinely conducted in OC financial investigations. In some jurisdictions they are made exclusively in the pre-trial stage and do not always constitute admissible evidence. In order to create accurate profiles, LEAs may need access to a variety of information held by others, including Tax, Customs and the FIU. In some jurisdictions this access is on-line; in others formal requests to another authority need to be made. 14. There appears to be a direct link between the international element of ML cases related to OCG, and the duration of the investigation and prosecution processes. These processes frequently become prolonged because of delays in receiving responses to mutual legal assistance requests. The report notes that prosecutors may sometimes request mutual legal assistance, where the evidence required may be capable of proof in other ways, through the more focused use of domestically available circumstantial evidence. 15. In order to increase timeliness and success of prosecutions, some jurisdictions have introduced special courts and/or prosecutors' offices as part of the judicial system, which have nationwide competences and jurisdiction for a series of specific offenses. This system has the advantage of reducing the possibility of local influence and corruption and deepening specialisation of judges and prosecutors in OC-related cases. 16. The report found that various FIUs and other LEAs, with long-standing experience in the ML area (including in its OC component), are capable individually of addressing the issues related to the fight against the legalisation of OC profits, but that often these efforts are fragmented and the overall outcome is limited. The report identifies obstacles in this area. Some of the most frequently noted difficulties related to obtaining evidence from abroad (especially from offshore jurisdictions) and to the continuing lack of transparency of the ownership of investigated corporate vehicles. The complexity of the financial flows which can be involved create particular challenges for investigators and prosecutors. 17. On a more positive note, valuable tools for OC asset tracing, freezing and confiscation were identified in the course of the research. These include exploitation of the analysis by the FIUs, use of FIU powers (monitoring of transactions, postponement), and use of financial profiling techniques. In addition, the more active use of Joint Investigations Teams (JITs) in appropriate transnational OC investigations is recommended. 18. The report identifies that some jurisdictions achieve success in autonomous ML cases without the necessity to establish precisely from which predicate offenses the laundered property comes. These cases are usually based on inferences drawn from facts and circumstances. This is particularly helpful in OC cases. However, the survey also indicated that there still remains resistance in many jurisdictions to challenging the courts with these types of autonomous and stand-alone cases. The report explains some of the jurisprudence in England and Wales on autonomous and stand-alone ML that has been followed in several other jurisdictions. The case studies also describe some of the successes that have been achieved following this line of jurisprudence. It is strongly recommended that more jurisdictions challenge their courts with cases based on this line of jurisprudence where there are OC connections. 19. The infiltration of financial institutions by OC through corruption (or by other means) is sometimes associated with identified criminal activities, such as illicit waste disposal, trafficking in endangered species, illegal investment in real estate projects, the facilitation of illegal immigration, drug and weapons trafficking, document counterfeiting and crimes which can be facilitated only with the authorisations of local or national administrations. While the incidence of this finding is not measured, it is considered that jurisdictions where the above-mentioned predicate offenses are prevalent, should be more alert to the risks of OC infiltrating financial institutions for ML purposes. 20. Finally the report focuses on typologies of ML cases where OC proceeds were laundered. It appears that the most common proceeds-generating crimes are of a financial nature (all forms of fiscal frauds, including tax evasion and internet-related frauds). The survey revealed that the FIUs' capacity and expertise in financial analysis is underused by law enforcement. Details: Strasbourg: COE, 2015. 93p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2015 at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Typologies/MONEYVAL(2015)20_typologies_launderingtheproceedsoforganisedcrime.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Typologies/MONEYVAL(2015)20_typologies_launderingtheproceedsoforganisedcrime.pdf Shelf Number: 136350 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureCriminal InvestigationsFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime |
Author: American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania Title: Guilty Property: How Law Enforcement Takes $1 Million in Cash from Innocent Philadelphians Every Year - and Gets Away with It Summary: Every year, Pennsylvania law enforcement agencies take roughly $14 million in cash, cars, and homes from property owners and never give it back. These confiscations are authorized by state civil asset forfeiture laws - powerful legal tools that let police and prosecutors seize and keep property that they claim was connected to a crime. But since civil forfeiture is based on the legal fiction that the property itself is "guilty," law enforcement doesn't actually have to charge the property owner with any wrongdoing, much less convict them of a crime. It's enough that someone is alleged to have committed a crime using the property. And because civil forfeitures are technically proceedings against property, not people, property owners aren't afforded the same constitutional protections they'd receive as criminal defendants. This forces property owners to wage complicated and time-consuming legal battles in civil court without the help of counsel or other safeguards. Under state civil forfeiture laws, all the revenue generated from forfeiture goes directly to law enforcement and can even be distributed to police and prosecutors as bonuses. As a result, the agencies making enforcement decisions have a strong financial incentive to pursue as many forfeitures as possible. In Philadelphia, the district attorney's share of forfeiture proceeds is roughly $2.2 million - or 7.3% of its appropriated budget. Assuming forfeiture proceeds are split between prosecutors and police in a similar ratio across the state, DA's offices in other counties aren't far behind. In fact, in four out of the next ten most populous counties, the DA would receive the equivalent of about 5% of its budget in forfeiture proceeds. Details: Philadelphia: ACLU of Pennsylvania, 2015. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 13, 2015 at: http://www.aclupa.org/files/3214/3326/0426/Guilty_Property_Report_-_FINAL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.aclupa.org/files/3214/3326/0426/Guilty_Property_Report_-_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 136391 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureCivil Forfeiture |
Author: Transparency International Title: Confiscation of Criminal and Illegal Assets: European Perspectives in Combat against Serious Crime Summary: In order to disrupt organised crime activities it is essential to deprive criminals of the proceeds of crime. Organised crime groups are building large-scale international networks and amass substantial profits from various criminal or illegal activities. The proceeds of crime are laundered and re-injected into the economy in order to be legalised. The confiscation/forfeiture of criminal or illegal assets is considered as a very effective way to fight organised crime, which is essentially profit-driven. Seizing back as much of these profits as possible aims at hampering activities of criminal organisations, deterring criminality and providing additional funds to invest back into law enforcement activities or other crime prevention initiatives. The relevance of this issue is in removing the economic gain from serious crime (including, but not limited to drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering, organised crime) in order to discourage the criminal and illegal conduct. The confiscation/forfeiture of assets has been in the focus of the attention of the European Union (EU) for quite some time now, but since 2001 there are documents that can indicate developments in the concept on behalf of European institutions. Confiscation of criminal assets and Illegal asset forfeiture policy follows the course set forth by the common EU policy in the area of justice and home affairs. This course is demonstrated by the special focus on corruption and organised crime in the Lisbon Treaty and the Stockholm Programme alike2. The EU strategic vision on these issues is reflected in the Stockholm Programme which sets down the priorities of the European Union in the area of justice, freedom and security for the period 2010 - 2014. Building on the achievements of past programmes, namely the Tampere and Hague Programmes, it aims at meeting future challenges and strengthening this area by measures focused on citizens' interests and needs. Details: Bulgaria: Transparency International; Bucuresti, Romania: Transparency International; Milan: Transparency International, 2015. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper: Accesses August 24, 2015 at: http://www.confiscation.eu/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Policy_Paper_EN_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.confiscation.eu/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Policy_Paper_EN_web.pdf Shelf Number: 136558 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureIllegal ProceedsOrganized Crime |
Author: Grigorov, Grigor Title: Forfeiture of Illegal Assets: Challenges and Perspectives of the Bulgarian Approach Summary: Confiscation of property acquired through crime and the forfeiture of illegal assets are instruments for active counteraction of serious crimes that are of nature to generate economic gain for their perpetrators or related persons. The application of such mechanisms indicates a firm political will and a particular governmental policy to combat crime. It is grounded on the awareness of an existing high risk of growing organised crime and corruption and the perception for its growing negative effect on the governance and economic development of the country. The reasons behind the adoption of legislation for forfeiture of illegal assets differ from one country to another but this specific approach should be taken as a clear policy against cumulation of assets whose legal origin cannot be proven. It aims at prevention and provides for dissuasive effect on future perpetrators. Ireland was one of the first countries to introduce in 1996 Asset Forfeiture in the form of the Criminal Assets Bureau which initiates civil forfeiture proceedings. Ever since this instrument has been part and parcel of a whole set of special legal provisions and institutions designed to enhance the effectiveness of counteracting organised crime and corruption in a large number of countries. Applying such an asset forfeiture mechanism in itself is a manifestation of a particular policy aiming to combat serious crime. The relevance of this problematic is in removing the economic gain from serious crime (including, but not limited to drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering, organised crime) in order to discourage the criminal conduct. Its importance is evidenced by the number of multilateral treaties that have been concluded and provide obligations for states to cooperate with one another on confiscation, asset sharing, legal assistance, and compensation of victims. Several United Nations conventions (including the United Nations Convention against corruption) and multilateral treaties contain provisions with regard to forfeiture of assets. The policy of counteracting organised crime and corruption signals a different approach in forfeiture of illegally acquired assets in favour of the state, in particular in view of the different problems it is designed to tackle. For example in Ireland the major objective is counteracting terrorism, and in Italy - forfeiture of assets belonging to the mafia. By its special nature the so called civil forfeiture allows for sanctioning of a larger set of actions related to strengthening the rule of law and restoring social justice. By its nature this is an encompassing policy - it is aimed not only at forfeiture of proceeds of crime in favour of the state as an ancillary mechanism regardless of the imposed penalty and the outcome of the criminal proceedings, but at any illegal assets (that is assets whose origin cannot be proven). Details: S0fia: Transparency International Bulgaria, 2014. 109p. Source: Internet Resource: National Report for Bulgaria: Accessed August 24, 2015 at: http://www.transparency.bg/media/cms_page_media/141/NationalReport_TI-BG_en_Forfeiture_of_Illegal_Assets_in_Bulgaria.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Bulgaria URL: http://www.transparency.bg/media/cms_page_media/141/NationalReport_TI-BG_en_Forfeiture_of_Illegal_Assets_in_Bulgaria.pdf Shelf Number: 136564 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureIllegal ProceedsOrganized Crime |
Author: Galabov, Antoniy Title: Legislation Meets Practice: National and European Perspectives in Confiscation and Forfeiture of Assets: Comparative Report. Summary: In order to disrupt organised crime activities it is essential to deprive criminals of the proceeds of crime. Organised crime groups are building largescale international networks and amass substantial profits from various criminal activities. The proceeds of crime are laundered and re-injected into the economy to be legalised. The confiscation/forfeiture and recovery of criminal or illegal assets is considered as a very effective way to fight organised crime, which is essentially profit-driven. Seizing back as much of these profits as possible aims at hampering activities of criminal organisations, deterring criminality and providing additional funds to invest back into law enforcement activities or other crime prevention initiatives. The relevance of this problematic is in removing the economic gain from serious crime (including, but not limited to drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering, organised crime) in order to discourage the criminal conduct. Its importance is evidenced by the number of multilateral treaties that have been concluded and provide obligations for states to cooperate with one another on confiscation, asset sharing, legal assistance, and compensation of victims. Several United Nations conventions and multilateral treaties contain provisions with regard to confiscation and forfeiture. The issue is also a matter of interest at European Union (EU) level with the new legislation adopted. However challenges still remain and should be addressed, so that cooperation can be more effective, since anti-fraud policy should be targeted in a trans-border perspective. The Stockholm programme called upon the Member States and the Commission to make the confiscation of criminal assets more efficient and to strengthen the cooperation between Asset Recovery Offices (AROs)3; EC report on cooperation between AROs (2011) has identified common capacity problems (insufficient personnel and resources, lack of common legislative framework), inadequate access to databases and judicial statistics. In this context, three national chapters of Transparency International, being also EU Member States, (TI-Bulgaria, TI-Italy and TI-Romania) are conducting a 24-month research and independent civil monitoring over the legal, institutional, and operational modes of the Asset Recovery Offices (AROs) and policies to outline their main strong and weak aspects in terms of competencies, capacity, performance and integrity. The aim of the project "Enhancing Integrity and Effectiveness of Illegal Asset Confiscation - European Approaches", funded by the "Prevention of and Fight against Crime" programme carried out by DG Home Affairs of the European Commission, is to support the effectiveness, accountability and transparency of asset confiscation/ forfeiture policies and practices in Europe, allowing for improved cooperation between authorities in Member states (MSs). The research provided for objective understanding of main strong and weak points in asset confiscation/ forfeiture legal, institutional and policy practices in Bulgaria, Romania and Italy. It became the basis for the independent civil monitoring and the exchange of know-how and good practices. The addressed shortcomings and recommendations will trigger improvement of the institutional and procedural capacities of national confiscation/forfeiture authorities at local and EU level, especially regarding transparency, accountability, integrity, modes of operation, human resource management, coherence with other relevant authorities, access to databases, use of expertise in asset assessments, cost effectiveness. The project findings from the monitoring (lessons learnt) will also be disseminated via the Transparency International network on regional, EU and international level. Ultimately, this means strengthened capacities of AROs, better chances for cooperation between MSs and civil society representatives. The publication is based on the work of the three national chapters of Transparency International that analyse and monitor the national models of confiscation/forfeiture of assets in Bulgaria, Italy and Romania. The aim is to provide information on the national approach on confiscation/forfeiture as regulated by the national law as well as to provide information on its implementation, based on civil monitoring on real cases tackled by the national confiscation authorities. The publication includes summaries of the three national models of confiscation/forfeiture of illegal/criminal assets (Bulgaria, Italy and Romania). In this part a critical analysis of the legislation is made to be used as a basis for identification of strong and weak features of each model. This is the basis for concrete recommendation for improvement of each model. The second part of the publication includes summaries of the reports for monitoring of the activities of the national confiscation/forfeiture authorities in the three countries. The actual reports are presented as attachments at the end of the book. Each monitoring report includes specific recommendations for improvement. The analysis of the indicators for transparency, integrity, accountability and efficiency in the work of confiscation authorities, based on the active monitoring, is provided as well. In addition the paper provides for a model for civil monitoring of the activities of national confiscation/ forfeiture authorities, which is irrelevant of the specific national model and could be used by civil society organizations in any country to monitor the activities of institutions in this respect. The presentation gives a special focus on the elaboration of an "ideal model" for confiscation/forfeiture at national level. This model is perceived as a set of common standards which should be applied in all EU MSs, in order to achieve transparency, accountability, integrity, efficiency and human rights protection, when confiscation/forfeiture procedures are at stake. Last but not least, the book provides for recommendations for adoption of more advanced common European standards at EU level in the field of confiscation/forfeiture of assets. Further improvement of the existing EU regulations shall contribute to the more successful work of national authorities. Details: Sofia: Transparency International Bulgaria, 2015. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 24, 2015 at: http://www.transparency.bg/media/publications/Final_Report_EN_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.transparency.bg/media/publications/Final_Report_EN_web.pdf Shelf Number: 136565 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureDrug TraffickingMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeProceeds of Crime |
Author: Council of Europe Title: Impact Study on Civil Forfeiture Summary: From the late 1980s onwards, the imperative for those (at both international and national levels) seeking to combat serious organised crime and other transnational offences (including corruption, economic crime and drug trafficking) has been to deprive those benefiting from such criminality of the financial rewards that they thereby obtain. As a result, one of the key changes in approach has been a shift in sentencing policy both nationally and as expressed in international instruments from the traditional aim which centred on penal measures up to and including imprisonment, rather than denying criminals of their illicit gains. Although confiscation had been available to courts in a number of jurisdictions from much earlier on, it tended to relate to confiscation of items such as seizure and destruction of drugs, or to weapons if used as instrumentalities to commit crimes. To address the modern trend of increasingly acquisitive (and very often cross-border) criminality the traditional approach was found to be insufficient as the fruits of the offending were still available for a criminal's enjoyment at the end of a prison sentence. The criminal justice sector across regions came to recognize that, if the aim of sentencing policy was to be effective deterrence, then it needed to hit the true aim of such criminality: making a profit. International instruments such as the 1988 Vienna Convention on Drug Trafficking, as the pioneering instrument, introduced the mechanism of confiscation for drug trafficking. This paved the way for extending confiscation to all other acquisitive crimes, including for bribery and corruption (first in a limited way in the UN Convention on Transnational and Organised Crime (UNTOC) and then, in 2003, more comprehensively in the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)). Meanwhile, in Europe, both the Council of Europe and the EU led the way in taking decisive steps to obligate their respective member states to put in place a framework for the restraint/seizure and confiscation of illicitly obtained assets. This was achieved through, in particular, the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism 2005 (the Council of Europe 2005 Convention) and four key EU Framework Decisions (2001/500/JHA; 2003/577/JHA; 2005/212/JHA; 2006/783/JHA). It should be noted, however, that the international instruments, although seminal to the development of asset recovery, have focused on post-conviction confiscation/asset recovery and have not, generally, addressed the subject matter of this study, civil forfeiture (sometimes referred to as confiscation in rem). They have certainly not discouraged it and, to that extent, they have left the way open to states to introduce it, but they have not taken the concept forward in any concerted way. The exception, and a powerful indicator of the importance of civil forfeiture in countering corruption, is UNCAC, which obligates each state party to consider whether civil forfeiture should be introduced within its jurisdiction . As a result of the (understandable and necessary) drive to establish a post-conviction confiscation framework in states, the reader is likely to be familiar with the legal mechanism for the recovery of illicitly obtained assets through criminal proceedings, where, at the end of a criminal trial, the Court, upon the application of the prosecution, or as a requirement of law, considers whether property derived from criminal activity should be forfeited so as to deprive the convicted person from enjoying the fruits of his criminality. This is the usual course of events and will, generally speaking, be the preferred option where the accused is found in the territory of a State and there is sufficient evidence to support a criminal prosecution. Indeed, this is, today, the position in most states. Details: Belgrade: Council of Europe, Belgrade Office, 2013. 96p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Publications/CAR/Impact%20Study%20on%20Civil%20Forfeiture_EN.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/corruption/Publications/CAR/Impact%20Study%20on%20Civil%20Forfeiture_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 137221 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureFinancial CrimesOrganized CrimeProceeds of Crime |
Author: Ayogu, Melvin D. Title: Illicit Financial Flows and Stolen Assets Value Recovery Summary: Value recovery of stolen assets is both an enforcement of anti-money laundering laws and a potent weapon against corruption. When obtainable, it represents society's credible commitment to ensure that "crimes do not pay." We explore these linkages by reviewing international experiences on the implementation of value recovery. Lessons suggest country-level studies that are more likely to strengthen local initiatives, leading to regional strategies capable of improving negotiations for assistance and cooperation at the global level. Details: Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Amherst, Political Economy Research Institute, 2014. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series, No. 364: Accessed November 9, 2015 at: http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP364.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP364.pdf Shelf Number: 149108 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureCorruptionFinancial CrimesMoney Laundering |
Author: Ayogu, Melvin D. Title: Governance and Illicit Financial Flows Summary: Insofar that it corrodes governance, engendering opportunistic crimes, grand corruption lies at the core of the problem of illicit financial flows. We identify at least two likely antagonistic circles in the illicit flow process - a virtuous circle and a vicious circle - both rooted in one common factor, namely, the strategic complementarity between corruption and governance. Also, we consider the scope of global governance architecture in encouraging banks to "do the crime, pay the fine, and do no time." Given this structure, the observed, rampant impudence of banks' participation in illicit financial flows is understandable and society would not be shocked should global mega-banks increasingly resemble a police establishment run by ex-convicts. Curbing illicit flows in such a circumstance would be daunting. Therefore, civil society must live up to its civic responsibilities by displacing the vicious cycle first through creating the right incentives for politicians to identify negatively with illicit financial flows. Details: Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Amherst, Political Economy Research Institute, 2014. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series, No. 366: Accessed November 11, 2015 at: http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP366.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_351-400/WP366.pdf Shelf Number: 137229 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture CorruptionFinancial Crimes Money Laundering |
Author: Forsaith, James Title: Study for an impact assessment on a proposal for a new legal framework on the confiscation and recovery of criminal assets Summary: The confiscation and recovery of criminal assets, which has a long pedigree within the criminal justice systems of many Member States, has in recent decades assumed a prominent position in the fight against organised crime. Led by Italy, many EU Member States have introduced asset confiscation laws which, by targeting the motivation for profit-driven crime, aim to deter would-be criminals. The force of this logic is easily demonstrated at the microeconomic level (by examining the choices facing individual decision-makers) but the macroeconomic consequences of asset confiscation remain poorly researched. Nevertheless, the logic is widely accepted - no doubt in part because depriving criminals of their ill-gotten gains is a politically attractive concept. Although asset confiscation is a popular concept with a basis in international law, EU law and Member State laws, these laws remain underdeveloped and underutilised. It is unlikely that any Member State confiscates a significant proportion of criminal assets and, accordingly, it is unlikely that the laws themselves are achieving their stated aim. To a large extent this may be because asset confiscation presents as a paradigm shift in criminal justice and agents of the state are likely to remain focused upon their tradition roles (arrest and prosecution) unless they face specific incentives to use the available tools. There are noticeable trends towards improved laws and greater utilisation, but these trends are not so strong as to render EU-level action unnecessary. This study for an impact assessment on a proposal for a new legal framework on the confiscation and recovery of criminal assets aims to assist the European Commission by providing inputs in aid of a formal impact assessment. These inputs consist of policy options for EU-level intervention analysed against evaluation criteria. The evaluation criteria and policy options have both been derived in consultation with the European Commission: the former based on the European Commission's own Impact Assessment Guidelines and the latter based on a problem definition produced as part of this study. This problem definition is based on extensive desk research and fieldwork which generated a detailed map of Member State asset confiscation laws, sought to understand their operation in practice and collated available statistical data. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND Europe, 2012. 259p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 14, 2015 at: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/RAND%20EUROPE%20Study%20Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/RAND%20EUROPE%20Study%20Final%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 137286 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureOrganized CrimeProceeds of Crime |
Author: Clemens, Austin Title: Asset Forfeiture in Texas: DPS and County Interactions Summary: Between 2003 and 2012, law enforcement agencies in Texas confiscated approximately $486 million in asset forfeiture cases. Texas is a target-rich environment for this law enforcement method due to the state's proximity to the Mexican border. Large shipments of drugs are sent north on Texan highways, while money earned from drug trafficking heads south. One of the most active interdiction agencies is the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS). Stops made by Highway Patrol can sometimes lead to multi-million dollar asset seizures. DPS can pursue either federal or state prosecution of suspects in these cases. This decision has important implications for District Attorneys (DA) in Texas, who receive a share of forfeited funds when state prosecution is pursued but will usually receive nothing in a federal prosecution. The choice can create tension between DAs and DPS. As requested by the legislature, this report explores the dynamic between DPS and the DAs in DPS-initiated forfeitures. Case data in 20 sampled counties from 2003 to 2012 are analyzed to determine: 1) trends in DPS interdiction behavior, 2) net benefits for counties of an average forfeiture case, and 3) patterns of expenditures and reliance on forfeiture funds in counties. Statewide forfeiture audit data reported to the Office of the Attorney General and interviews with DPS officials and nine district attorneys were also incorporated into the analysis. Details: Austin, TX: Texas Office of Court Administration, 2015. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 14, 2015 at: http://www.txcourts.gov/media/782473/sting-report-final.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.txcourts.gov/media/782473/sting-report-final.pdf Shelf Number: 137290 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureDrug TraffickersProceeds of Crime |
Author: Transparency International UK Title: Combating Money Laundering and Recovered Looted Gains: Raising the UK's Game Summary: As an anti-corruption body, Transparency International UK (TI-UK) is concerned with preventing money laundering since the facility to launder the proceeds of corruption gives rise to the commission of bribery and corruption offences in the first place. TI helped international banks to establish the Wolfsburg Principles (the global anti-money laundering guidelines for private banking) in 2000. Reports by TI-UK in 2003 and 2004 focused on corruption and money laundering in the UK and the regulation of trust and company service providers, respectively. This report focuses on the following main areas: - Strengthening the UK's defences against dirty money with particular emphasis on improving due diligence by financial and other institutions and organisations required to conduct due diligence on Politically Exposed Persons; - Criminal and civil mechanisms for the recovery of assets that are the proceeds of corruption; and - Bolstering the efforts of the UK's law enforcement agencies and improving the UK's ability to help developing countries in identifying and recovering stolen assets through more efficient processes and procedures. Details: London: Transparency International UK, 2015. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 14, 2015 at: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/154-combating-money-laundering-and-recovering-looted-gains-raising-the-uks-game/154-combating-money-laundering-and-recovering-looted-gains-raising-the-uks-game Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/15-publications/154-combating-money-laundering-and-recovering-looted-gains-raising-the-uks-game/154-combating-money-laundering-and-recovering-looted-gains-raising-the-uks-game Shelf Number: 137766 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureCorruptionMoney LaunderingProceeds of Crime |
Author: Spain. Ministry of Interior Title: White Paper on Best Practices in Asset Recovery. CEART Project Summary: The recovery of assets with a criminal origin is one of the priorities of criminal policy within the European Union, as reflected in several legal instruments on this topic that have been adopted in recent years. The CEART Project, which tries to be a small contribution to the efforts carried out by the European Union in this field, had some ambitious objectives that could not have been reached without the unconditional support of its partners: Rey Juan Carlos University, Europol and the Asset Recovery Offices from Belgium, Scotland (United Kingdom), Hungary and Poland. With the publication of this White Paper on Best Practices in Asset Recovery, a compendium of the most effective current practices in the asset recovery field, in both the European Union and United States and Canada, one of the main goals of the CEART project has been achieved. The exchange of best practices is already included as a key point in Decision 2007/845/JHA, of 6 December 2007 concerning co-operation between Asset Recovery Offices of the Member States in the field of tracing and identifying proceeds from, or other property related to crime, a regulation that represents one of the cornerstones in the field of asset recovery in the European Union. Likewise, the CEART Project has given great importance to the training of the people working in this field. Without these two key points, training and the exchange of best practices, it is difficult to improve the effectiveness of the efforts of the Member States in the tracing and identification of assets coming from crime. Both topics were already highlighted in the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 20 November 2008 - Proceeds of organized crime: ensuring that "crime does not pay". Details: Madrid: Ministry of Interior, 2012. 292p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 14, 2015 at: http://vangogh.fcjs.urjc.es/~jesus/Home_files/WBoBPiAR_CEART_2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://vangogh.fcjs.urjc.es/~jesus/Home_files/WBoBPiAR_CEART_2012.pdf Shelf Number: 137295 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingProceeds of Crime |
Author: Marshall, Andrew Title: What's Yours Is Mine: New Actors and New Approaches to Asset Recovery in Global Corruption Cases Summary: This study is about recovering money stolen by corrupt politicians and officials. Asset recovery is a key element in deterring and punishing the corrupt, and the reduction of corruption is critical to development. The money can be put to better uses once recovered, and it amounts to billions. But there's another reason why this is significant for those who are primarily focused on development: among the key issues in asset recovery are greater accountability and transparency, which are also increasingly regarded as key to long-term development success. The main argument of this study is that corruption investigations and asset recovery are being tackled in new ways by new actors from the private sector, civil society, and media, and that this can help improve the prospects for justice. It would be too much to call this a revolution: it's an evolutionary process. It needs long-term support if it is to prosper as a policy choice, and it raises some issues for policymakers and those who carry out the recoveries. But if the agenda for accountability is to advance at the same pace as transparency, the prosecution of the corrupt and the return of the money they stole is critical. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2013. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: CGD Policy Paper 018: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/whats-yours-is-mine_0.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/whats-yours-is-mine_0.pdf Shelf Number: 137702 Keywords: Asset ForfeiturePolitical CorruptionProceeds of Crime |
Author: Wood, Helena Title: The Big Payback: Examining Changes in the Criminal Confiscation Orders Enforcement Landscape Summary: The UK legislation for removing the proceeds of crime from the hands of convicted criminals, governed by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), is viewed as particularly punitive due to its ability to capture a wide pool of income and assets, some of which are not linked to the indictable offence. While this is desirable in policy terms, the broad framing of the law has created unintended consequences for those charged with enforcing the orders and the system has faced increasing criticism, most prominently in a 2013 report of the National Audit Office (NAO), regarding the disparity between the levels of orders made in the courts and the amounts eventually collected from the criminal. The NAO's report and some of the wider media coverage could be criticised for their focus on revenue-raising and 'value for money' rather than the impact on criminals, and for their failure to highlight the complexity of the law and the extent to which this (and not administrative failures) has led to the backlog of uncollected confiscation orders - currently L1.6 billion and rising. However the report did make a number of valid points, including on multi-agency co-ordination, and provided a catalyst for the government to recognise the centrality of the enforcement process to the success of the confiscation-orders regime as a whole. This paper examines the legislative and systemic changes to the confiscation-order enforcement process introduced by the government in 2014 and 2015, and examines the extent to which these offer the needed shift in priority towards enforcement to reduce the current backlog and to prevent a future build-up. The paper then makes recommendations for consideration by policy-makers. Details: London: Royal University Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), 2016. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: RUSI Occasional Paper, February 2016: Accessed March 14, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_op_the_big_payback.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_op_the_big_payback.pdf Shelf Number: 138223 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureConfiscation OrdersOrganized CrimesProceeds of Crime |
Author: Wood, Helena Title: Enforcing Criminal Confiscation Orders: From Policy to Practice Summary: The enforcement process for criminal confiscation orders operating under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) has faced considerable criticism from both parliamentary and media commentators. The POCA was indeed a significant step forward and addressed the need to adopt effective measures to tackle the proceeds of criminal activity. However, the criminal-confiscation regime has a number of flaws, particularly in the practical challenges of enforcement. These were most prominently highlighted by the 2013 review conducted by the National Audit Office which led to calls for the development of a more effective system. The headlines make for stark reading: L1.6 billion in unenforced confiscation orders, an amount which is continuing to rise. This paper is structured around two key issues. First, it examines how the law has been framed and applied. It provides a detailed analysis of the process, shedding light on some of the weaknesses of the current legislative environment. In addressing the second issue - unenforced confiscation orders - the paper specifically examines the assets on which these orders are based. The paper's overall purpose is to assess the extent to which the law, rather than administrative failings, is the root cause of the large value of uncollected orders. In short, to what extent do real assets exist against which the authorities can take enforcement action? Details: London: London: Royal University Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), 2016. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed March 14, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_op_enforcing_criminal_confiscation_orders.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_op_enforcing_criminal_confiscation_orders.pdf Shelf Number: 138224 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureConfiscation OrdersOrganized CrimeProceeds of Crime |
Author: Great Britain. National Audit Office Title: Confiscation Orders: Progress Review Summary: government's administration of criminal confiscation orders has seen a greater focus on enforcing the orders, according to the NAO. Many of the fundamental weaknesses identified two years ago remain, however, and the system of managing confiscation orders has not been transformed. Confiscation orders are the main way through which the government carries out its policy to deprive criminals of the proceeds of their crimes. The spending watchdog reported on the administration of confiscation orders in December 2013, concluding that the process was not working well enough and did not provide value for money. The Committee of Public Accounts subsequently made six recommendations for the system's improvement, which were accepted by the government. Today's report found that the criminal justice bodies involved have made some progress against most of the Committee's recommendations. Despite this, the NAO considers that the only recommendation which has been fully addressed is that the sanctions for non-payment should be strengthened. The Home Office introduced new legislation which includes longer default prison sentences and powers for judges to impose travel bans for non-payers. It is too early to conclude, however, whether these changes will prove successful. Since 2014, the criminal justice bodies have improved how they administer confiscation orders, with greater focus on enforcement and better joint working across bodies including the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office. This has led to a $22 million (16%) increase in confiscated income in two years and the highest amount collected to date. The number of orders imposed, however, has fallen by 7% and are made in only a tiny fraction of total crimes. According to the NAO, more could be done to reduce confiscation order debt, which has risen by $158 million to $1.61 billion in the last two years. Much of the debt now relates to orders which are at least 5 years old and HM Courts & Tribunals Service assessed that only $203 million of this total debt can realistically be collected. There are, however, fewer financial investigators, which has reduced the capacity needed to help recover high-value orders, and the use of restraint orders to freeze an offender's assets has also fallen by 12%. Both are key to successful enforcement. There is also the potential for more collection, for example through greater involvement of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office to find and repatriate assets transferred overseas or changes in the law to stop criminals hiding illicit assets under other people's names. The Criminal Finances Improvement Plan, which set out 11 objectives covering the whole administrative process of managing confiscation orders, has helped galvanise efforts to improve the enforcement of orders since its launch in 2014. The government has not however met its ambitious targets for the plan's implementation. In addition, the plan does not set out agreed success measures nor make clear the priority of the government's objectives for confiscation. Competing priorities have also affected the push to increase the use of confiscation orders, as while the government aspires for law enforcement agencies to treat confiscation orders as a priority, most police forces do not consider asset recovery a priority compared to other areas of law enforcement, such as countering extremism. Details: London: NAO, 2016. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: HC: 886, 2015-16: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Confiscation-orders-progress-review.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Confiscation-orders-progress-review.pdf Shelf Number: 138254 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureConfiscation OrdersProceeds of Crime |
Author: American Civil Liberties Union of Nebraska Title: Guilty Money: Civil Asset Forfeiture in Nebraska Summary: Police abuse of civil asset forfeiture laws has shaken our nation's conscience. Civil forfeiture allows police to seize - and then keep or sell - any property they suspect may be involved in a crime. Owners need not ever be arrested or convicted of a crime for their cash, cars, or even real estate to be taken away permanently by the government. The ACLU does not believe that all instances or uses of civil forfeiture are inherently wrong. In our research, we reviewed many court cases in which the forfeited property was found alongside drugs and the owner was ultimately convicted of a felony. In these cases, civil forfeiture operated according to plan - those dealing and smuggling drugs lost their money. However, an unacceptable number of cases involved everyday people who became entangled in an unfair system and who lost their personal property and assets even after there was no finding of wrongdoing or criminal activity. Reasonable civil forfeiture reform should allow law enforcement to seize money that is unquestionably a part of illegal activity while also allowing everyone to safely travel with cash without having to fear losing it to law enforcement. Civil asset forfeiture reform is an emerging public policy issue due to recent well-publicized incidents indicating abuse of the process and the real life impact on everyday people in Nebraska. This issue is one that has found broad bipartisan support across the political spectrum and the same should hold true in the great state of Nebraska. We believe the current landscape for civil asset forfeiture laws can lead to abuse and that too many innocent people are being caught up in forfeiture seizures. We examined personal anecdotes from forfeiture victims and data from government, law enforcement, and non-profit organizations and we found many troubling trends and practices. Our research has also identified several promising policy reform solutions tested in other jurisdictions that could be beneficial for consideration in Nebraska. Details: Lincoln, NE: ACLU of Nebraska, 2015. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 26, 2016 at: https://www.aclunebraska.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/guilty_money_civil_forfeiture-final.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.aclunebraska.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/guilty_money_civil_forfeiture-final.pdf Shelf Number: 138430 Keywords: Asset Forfeiture |
Author: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Title: Tracking Anti-Corruption and Asset Recovery Commitments. A Progress Report and Recommendations for Action Summary: At the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, Ghana in 2008, more than 1 700 participants from governments, aid agencies and civil society organizations came together to review progress on the Paris Declaration and to define the steps forward to further improve aid effectiveness. One result was the Accra Agenda for Action, in which donor countries committed themselves to fight corruption, in particular to "take steps in their own countries to combat corruption by individuals or corporations and to track, freeze, and recover illegally acquired assets." This declaration created momentum in the international fight against corruption, addressing a facet that had hitherto been largely neglected by the international development community, but which has important repercussions worldwide. Vast sums of financial assets are stolen from developing countries and hidden in financial centers around the world - money that could provide education, food or health services to the poor. Estimates reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and, although, there is some disagreement about these figures, it is clear that they probably exceed the level of official development assistance by a significant margin. Those stolen assets can be returned to their lawful owners and used for development programs, sending a clear message to corrupt political leaders that OECD countries are prepared to take action against corrupt practices at home. This publication reviews the compliance of 30 OECD donor countries with the anti-corruption commitments they made in Accra. It assesses progress in combating corruption and in tracking and recovering illegal assets to inform decision-makers of progress at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which will be held in Busan in November 2011. The report shows that four countries - Australia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States - have repatriated a total of USD $ 227 million to foreign jurisdictions between 2006 and 2009, with another two countries - France and Luxembourg - having frozen assets pending a court decision. Assets frozen total slightly over USD $ 1.2 billion. The findings of the report highlight the need to develop a concrete follow-up action plan in Busan, as most countries have not yet taken sufficient steps to translate the commitments they made in Accra into policies generating concrete results. However, positive examples show that, with strong political leadership and institutional mechanisms in place, important results can be achieved in the fight against corruption and asset recovery. Details: OECD and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, 2011. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/Anti-corruption-and-Asset-Recovery-commitments-%28Accra%29.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: https://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/Anti-corruption-and-Asset-Recovery-commitments-%28Accra%29.pdf Shelf Number: 138496 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureCorruptionFinancial CrimeProceeds of Crime |
Author: Cohen, Derek Title: Without Due Process of Law: The Conservative Case for Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Summary: There is little dispute among the conservative movement that criminals who would threaten the safety of our communities deserve to be divested of the fruits of their illicit enterprise. Drug dealers should lose possession of vehicles used to facilitate offenses in addition to the criminal sanction they face. However, civil asset forfeiture-the practice of taking ownership of real or personal property allegedly connected to criminal activity but not requiring the criminal activity to be alleged, much less proven-has recently garnered significant outrage in the states. Tales of long-term abuses (such as those in Tenaha, Texas) and unconscionable takings (such as the entirety of Michigan grocer Terry Dehko's bank account containing over $35,000) have taken root in the public conscience as emblematic of what the state, given unchecked authority, is capable of (Cohen). This affront to central conservative ideals of property rights, due process, and rule of law has prompted several "red" states to enact comprehensive reforms, ranging from removing the incentives to engage in the practice to wholesale abolition. New Mexico, for example, has recently enacted a spate of reforms that essentially abolish civil asset forfeiture and equitable sharing, while remanding the proceeds of criminal forfeiture to a communal fund. Montana now requires a criminal conviction before assets can be forfeited and, in tandem, raised the threshold that the state must meet to perfect the forfeiture post-conviction. Even when states do pass individual protections such as raising the burden of proof or providing counsel in forfeiture proceedings, "equitable sharing" offers an easy mechanism to skirt these protections. While the majority of forfeitures are conducted under state law, local or state agencies may partner with the federal law enforcement agencies in enforcement efforts and select the least restrictive jurisdiction through which to process the forfeiture. North Carolina has long prohibited the practice, but unfortunately has been subject to above-average equitable sharing use. While commonsense conservative solutions to reform the practice have been attempted in nearly all states, efforts are stymied by special interests that directly benefit from forfeiture disbursements. These agencies have grown addicted to this unappropriated source of funding, with nearly 40 percent indicating that the money constitutes a necessary income source (Cohen). This paper highlights the two most comprehensive efforts to catalogue the relative ranking of the protections (or lack thereof) states provide their citizens, discusses commonly used fallacies by proponents of the status quo, and enumerates several reforms that states may implement to ensure criminals are held to account for their misdeeds while sparing the property rights of innocent property owners. Details: Austin, TX: Texas Public Policy Foundation, 2015. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Perspective: Accessed April 14, 2015 at: http://www.texaspolicy.com/library/doclib/PP-Without-Due-Process-of-Law-The-Conservative-Case-for-Civil-Asset-Forfeiture-Reform.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.texaspolicy.com/library/doclib/PP-Without-Due-Process-of-Law-The-Conservative-Case-for-Civil-Asset-Forfeiture-Reform.pdf Shelf Number: 138665 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureDue ProcessProceeds of Crime |
Author: Victorian Law Reform Commission Title: Use of Regulatory Regimes in Preventing the Infiltration of Organised Crime into Lawful Occupations and Industries - Consultation Paper Summary: Referral to the Commission 1.1 On 29 October 2014, the then Attorney-General, the Hon. Robert Clark, MP, asked the Victorian Law Reform Commission, under section 5(1)(a) of the Victorian Law Reform Commission Act 2000 (Vic), to review and report on the use of regulatory regimes to help prevent organised crime and criminal organisations entering into or operating through lawful occupations and industries. 1.2 Lawful occupations and industries may be used to enable or facilitate organised crime and to conceal or launder the proceeds of crime. In 2014, the Parliament of Victoria Law Reform, Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee recommended that the Victorian Government investigate the appropriateness of using administrative regulatory measures to reduce the opportunities available to organised crime groups for engaging in illegal activities in Victoria. 1.3 Regulatory regimes are the laws, regulations, policies and instruments that regulate particular occupations and industries; for example, laws that provide that only fit and proper people can obtain licences to operate in particular occupations or industries. Regulatory regimes may assist in preventing the infiltration of organised crime groups into lawful occupations and industries. 1.4 There are other legal responses to organised crime under Victorian and Commonwealth law which are, in general, not focused on specific occupations or industries. These include anti-association laws, anti-fortification laws, tools for the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences committed by organised crime groups, anti-money laundering laws, laws allowing for the forfeiture or confiscation of the proceeds of crime, and "unexplained wealth" laws. Scope of the review 1.5 The Commission's review is determined by the terms of reference. The terms of reference ask the Commission whether a framework of principles can be established for: - assessing the risks of organised crime infiltration of different lawful occupations or industries - developing suitable regulatory responses. 1.6 The Commission's report will present recommendations for these two sets of principles. In establishing these principles, the Commission has been asked to consider, among other matters: - the experience of Victoria and other jurisdictions in using occupational and industry regulation to help prevent organised crime infiltration of lawful occupations or industries - the implications for the overall efficiency and effectiveness of regulatory regimes of using such regimes to help prevent organised crime infiltration of lawful occupations or industries - the costs and benefits of regulatory options to assist in preventing organised crime infiltration of lawful occupations or industries. Details: Melbourne: The Commission, 2015. 88p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2016 at: http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/VLRC_Regulatory_Regimes_consultation_paper_%20for_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/VLRC_Regulatory_Regimes_consultation_paper_%20for_web.pdf Shelf Number: 138790 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureMoney LaunderingOrganized CrimeProceeds of Crime |
Author: Martin, Karin D. Title: Shackled to Debt: Criminal Justice Financial Obligations and the Barriers to Re-entry They Create Summary: The authors discuss the long-term and unintended consequences of criminal justice financial obligations (CJFOs): fines, forfeiture of property, court fees, supervision fees, and restitution. The authors find that CJFOs are imposed at multiple stages of justice involvement, generating complexities that are difficult to navigate for both individuals and system actors alike. Additionally, financial sanctions are usually imposed without regard for individuals' ability to pay, and yet failure to pay can trigger additional monetary and criminal sanctions. This means that relatively minor initial infractions can result in large debt accrual and escalating involvement in criminal justice systems. Current systems of criminal justice financial obligations can also generate perverse incentives for justice-involved individuals - who may forego pursuing long-term sustainability in favor of being able to pay off their criminal justice debt quickly – and for system actors. Probation and parole officers, for example, may find that their ability to foster trust and positive behavior change in the lives of those they supervise is compromised by the role of debt collector. Consequences of criminal justice debt can undermine post-incarceration re-entry goals such as finding stable housing, transportation and employment. Failure to achieve these goals is costly not only for justice-involved individuals, but also in terms of public safety outcomes. To address the complexity, perverse incentives, and individual and social costs of CJFOs, the report presents recommendations in seven areas: (1) Factor in ability to pay when assessing CJFOs; (2) Eliminate “poverty penalties” (e.g. interest, application fees for payment plans, late fees, incarceration for failure to meet payments); (3) Implement alternatives to monetary sanctions where appropriate (i.e. community service); (4) Provide amnesty for people currently in debt due to CJFOs; (5) Deposit any CJFOs that are collected into a trust fund for the express purpose of rehabilitation for people under supervision; (6) Establish an independent commission in each jurisdiction to evaluate the consequences of CJFOs; and (7) Relieve probation, parole, and police officers of the responsibility of collecting debt. Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, 2017. Source: Internet Resource: New Thinking in Community Corrections, no. 4: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249976.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249976.pdf Shelf Number: 140932 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureCourt FeesCriminal DebtCriminal Justice FinesFinancial SanctionsMonetary SanctionsPovertyPrisoner ReentryRestitution |
Author: Australian National Audit Office Title: Proceeds of Crime: Australian Federal Police; Australian Financial Security Authority Attorney-General's Department Summary: The objective of this audit was to examine the effectiveness of the Australian Federal Police's, the Australian Financial Security Authority's and the Attorney-General's Department's administration of property and funds under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Background 1. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (the POCA) provides a scheme (the"POCA scheme") to trace, restrain and confiscate the proceeds of crimes against Commonwealth law. It seeks to disrupt, deter and reduce crime by undermining the profitability of criminal enterprises, depriving persons of the benefits derived from crime, and preventing reinvestment of the proceeds in further criminal activity. 2. The POCA also provides a scheme that allows for confiscated funds to be given back to the community in an endeavour to prevent and reduce the harmful effects of crime in Australia. This mechanism has provided funding to non-government and community organisations, local councils, as well as Commonwealth and state police forces and Commonwealth criminal intelligence entities. Audit objective and criteria 3. The audit objective was to assess whether the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Australian Financial Security Authority (AFSA) and the Attorney-General's Department (AGD) effectively carried out key operational and advisory functions related to property and proceeds under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 4. To form a conclusion against the audit objective, the ANAO adopted the following high-level audit criteria: effective restraint is achieved by the AFP and/or AFSA through the timely implementation of appropriate court orders; AFSA administers restrained property in an efficient and economical manner and consistent with relevant court orders; AFSA disposes of forfeited property in an appropriate manner and transfers the net proceeds to the Confiscated Assets Account; AGD provides advice to the Minister for Justice on which proposals for funding from the Confiscated Assets Account represent the best value for money; and the AFP and AFSA report against benchmarked performance measures. Conclusion 5. The AFP, AFSA and AGD effectively carry out key operational and advisory functions related to property and proceeds under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 6. Risk based planning procedures are in place for deciding which property should be restrained and what conditions should be placed on the property when seeking a restraining order. The manner in which restraining orders are implemented depends on the type of property under restraint. For the major classes of property, AFP and AFSA processes have worked well and custody and control of property has been achieved in a way that minimises the risk of the property being dissipated. 7. AFSA has appropriate custodial arrangements in place for all types of property. Legislative and administrative constraints currently limit the ability the of Official Trustee to achieve improved rates of return from the substantial amount of funds held in the restrained and forfeited monies bank accounts and the Confiscated Assets Account. AFSA also manages property in a way that is consistent with the relevant court orders and disposes of forfeited property in an appropriate manner in order to maximise the sale proceeds. 8. The AGD has established effective processes to identify the possible use of funds from the Confiscated Assets Account. It has also advised the Minister for Justice on proposals to assist in achieving value for money from expenditure. During the financial years 2010-11 to 2015-16, the main beneficiaries of funding have been Commonwealth law enforcement and criminal intelligence agencies. Significant funding has also been approved for non-government, community organisation and local council projects, with the New South Wales, Victorian and Queensland police forces also receiving funding. 9. The AFP publicly reports the estimated recovery value of property restrained each year. When combined with the Australian Crime Commission's (ACC's) public reporting of the estimated value of property confiscated each year, this illustrates the trends in the amount of criminal proceeds intercepted by the POCA scheme. AFSA also undertakes limited public reporting on its administration of property. This reporting does not include information on the costs of administering property under its custody and control, which is an important aspect of its overall performance in relation to the proceeds of crime. However, AFSA has made some improvements in its internal reporting capacity about the costs of managing property and is in the early stages of developing benchmarks for some aspects of these costs. Supporting findings Restraining property 10. Planning and decision-making procedures by the Criminal Assets Confiscation Taskforce investigators and litigators relating to restraint are risk-based. Where the AFP has judged that the risk of dissipation is high, restraining order applications include a provision for custody and control of the property to be granted to AFSA. 11. Restraining orders are implemented in a timely manner and in a way that minimises the risk of property being dissipated. However, the AFP could do more to register orders involving motor vehicles on the Personal Property Securities Register (PPSR) in a timely manner. Custody and disposal of property 12. Custodial arrangements for property that has been placed into the custody and control of AFSA vary depending on the type of property restrained. Testing demonstrates that appropriate custodial arrangements are in place for all types of property. Management of the funds held in the restrained and forfeited monies bank accounts and the Confiscated Assets Account reflect legislative and administrative constraints that limit the ability of the Official Trustee to achieve improved rates of return from the substantial amount of funds held in these accounts. 13. AFSA manages property in a way that is consistent with the relevant court orders. Where consent, variation and/or exclusion orders are granted by the court, AFSA has acted consistently with the court order. 14. In 2015-16, the disposal processes utilised by AFSA have achieved sale proceeds from forfeited property which have exceeded the estimated value of the property, as determined by an independent and/or certified valuer, in 76 per cent of matters, including all of the higher-value property. How funds from the Confiscated Assets Account are used 15. The processes through which the possible use of funds - stand-alone projects or grant programs-are identified and submitted for the Minister for Justice's approval have evolved over time. In recent years, more structured and targeted processes have been implemented in order to assist in achieving better overall outcomes from Confiscated Assets Account funding. The AGD provided the Minister with relevant advice to assist him in meeting his decision making obligations. 16. The main beneficiaries of funding from the Confiscated Assets Account have been Commonwealth criminal intelligence or law enforcement entities. Significant funds have been approved for non-government, community organisation and local council projects, mainly through the Safer Streets Programme. The New South Wales, Victorian and Queensland police forces have also received funding. Performance Monitoring and Reporting 17. The AFP publicly reports on the estimated recovery value of property restrained each year and whether the AFP has met the benchmark set for that year. It also internally monitors another key performance measure-the estimated value of property confiscated each year-which is publicly reported by the ACC. These two measures illustrate the trends in the criminal proceeds intercepted by the POCA scheme. In the context of a current AFP wide review of performance measures, additional metrics could be developed to provide better information both on the AFP's performance in litigating POCA cases and, in the longer term, the effect of the POCA scheme on the underlying criminal economy. 18. AFSA's public reporting on its administration of property under its custody and control is limited to high-level information. It is in the early stages of developing an improved internal reporting capacity to monitor the costs of managing property under AFSA custody and control. This work could be also be used to enable public reporting of the costs to administer such property, which is an important aspect of AFSA's overall performance and responsibilities under the POCA scheme. Details: Canberra: ANAO, 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: ANAO Report No. 43 2016-17: Accessed April 6, 2017 at: https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net2766/f/ANAO_Report_2016-2017https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/g/files/net2766/f/ANAO_Report_2016-2017_43_0.pdf_43_0.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: Shelf Number: 144738 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureCriminal AssetsFinancial CrimesProceeds of Crime |
Author: Snead, Jason Title: An Overview of Recent State-Level Forfeiture Reforms Summary: Civil asset forfeiture laws allow for the seizure of property suspected of having been involved in, or derived from, criminal activity. In most states and at the federal level, no criminal charges or convictions are necessary because the resulting civil proceeding targets theproperty - not its owner. Civil forfeiture laws grant individuals challenging forfeiture cases considerably fewer legal protections than they would enjoy if they were defendants in criminal cases, and allow the law enforcement agencies that execute the seizures to retain the proceeds of successful forfeitures, creating a significant incentive to seize property. For decades, states have expanded the scope and reach of civil forfeiture, but within the past few years-driven by a growing number of accounts of abusive forfeitures and a recognition of the power of the forfeiture funding mechanism to distort the priorities of law enforcement organizations - many have reevaluated their civil forfeiture laws, scaling back or totally abolishing the tool. The message is clear: outside the law enforcement community, there is little support for the forfeiture status quo. Details: Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2016. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Backgrounder: Accessed September 18, 2017 at: http://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/overview-recent-state-level-forfeiture-reforms Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/overview-recent-state-level-forfeiture-reforms Shelf Number: 147382 Keywords: Asset ForfeitureFinancial CrimeProceeds of Crime |